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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 1989, a free trade agreement between the United
States of America and Canada [hereinafter FTA or Agreement]
entered into force.1 The Agreement contained a new form of
dispute settlement for issues covered by the FTA. After two years,
the specific rules that govern the binational and extraordinary
challenge procedures of the dispute mechanism need modification.
This paper will examine these procedures as implemented by the
FTA involving antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD)
determinations by the United States and Canada [hereinafter the
Parties] and recommend specific changes.
In order to understand the current state of the binational dispute
mechanism, it is necessary to comprehensively evaluate the entire
legal regime. This commentary begins, in Part II, by reviewing the
procedural rules [hereinafter Rules] 2 negotiated in Chapter
1. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1989, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281
(1989) [hereinafter FTA]. See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)); An Act to Implement the Free
Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America, House of Commons, 34th Pad.,
1st Sess., 37 Eliz. 2 (1988).
2. Procedures and Rules for Implementing Article 1904 of the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement, Office of Binational Secretariat Publication, 19 C.F.R. § 356 (1988). Notice of
effective date. 54 Fed. Reg. 5930 (1989). There are other dispute mechanisms in the FTA. They cover
disputes regarding investments, disputes pertaining to emergency measures, and general provisions
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Nineteen of the FTA to provide a historical identification of the
overriding goals and mechanisms envisioned by the FTA's
negotiators. Part III points out selected problems that have emerged
over the first two years of the Agreement's operation and proposes
specific solutions. Part IV recommends options for implementing
the solutions in light of the current North American Free Trade
Area negotiations (NAFTA) 3 and the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 Finally, Part
V ties together the solutions to the ultimate success of the free
trade process.
II. THE PROCEDURAL RULES
The Rules for binational panel disputes and extraordinary
challenges are outlined in Chapter Nineteen of the Agreement and
have been codified by the responsible federal agencies.5 The Rules
were drafted with the aim of creating a binding, swift, and
independent judicial review of AD and CVD determinations by the
parties.' The overriding concern from a business perspective7 in
which apply to all disputes not specifically dealt with under the above categories. See Apuzzo &
Kerr, InternationalArbitration-The Dispute Settlement Procedures Chosen for the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1988, at 7 (Ihe dispute mechanism for AD and CVD
disputes have elements of a judicial hearing).
3. The U.S. Executive Branch received congressional fast-track authority to pursue a free
trade agreement with Mexico in May, 1991. 137 CoNe. REC. H3516 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
Canada will also participate in the negotiations.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedforsignature Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat.
pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATI], reprinted in GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AN TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AD SELECTED DoCuMENTs 1-78 (1969).
5. The agencies responsible for promulgating technical rules of procedure for the binational
panels are the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Canadian Department of National Revenue.
The Secretariats are independent bodies in each nation's capitol. The American Secretary is James
R. Holbein, former Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of International Trade at the
Department of State; his office is located at the Binational Secretariat, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Washington, D.C. The Canadian Secretariat is headed by Ellen Beall, former Acting
Senior Counsel, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, and is located at Canadian Section, Royal
Bank Centre, Ottawa, Ontario.
6. U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., SUMMARY Op THE U.S.-CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 38 (Feb. 1988).
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establishing the binational panel review process is that trade
determinations by either government should be completed more
quickly than under previous domestic procedures.' It is for these
reasons that the Rules have been drafted with an eye toward the
arbitral rather than the judicial model.9 The decisions of panels are
binding on the parties to the dispute1" and, in keeping with these
requirements, the panels are considered independent and final
judicial bodies replacing the domestic courts of both countries. 1
The following section examines the Rules of the binational dispute
procedure to provide the reader with an understanding of the basic
goals and specific rules. The purpose of presenting this background
is to familiarize the reader with the dispute mechanism for the
section that follows on the problems that have arisen since the FTA
entered into force.
A. The Negotiating History
It is important to understand the background of the Agreement
in order to assess whether the Rules have advanced the goals of the
original negotiations. The history of the FTA negotiations is also
interesting from legal and political perspectives. The Canadian and
U.S. governments developed a comprehensive trade agreement,
namely the FTA, from what started out as a modest desire to lower
7. Ferguson, Dispute Settlement Under the CDA-US FTA, 47 U. ToRONwo FAc. L. REv. 317,
324 (1989). In this article the author, Professor Ferguson, argues that the FrA binational panel
process creates an improved trading regime because it is a more stable and predictable environment,
thereby reducing trade-distorting behavior. Id There is also the concern of the cost of long and
complex CVD proceedings. Normal CVD cases cost litigants hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Horlick & Landers, The Free Trade Agreement Working Group: Developing a Harmonizing and
Improved Countervailing Duty Law, in ABA CONFEREN CE NATIONAL INsTrruTE ON U.S4CANADA
FTA: ECONOMIC AND LEOAL IMPICATIONs 405-06 (1988) (transcribing many speeches from the
ABA's conference in Washington, D.C., Jan. 28-29, 1988).
8. See infra note 34 (describing the speed of the pre-PTA trade dispute procedure).
9. Apuzzo & Kerr, supra note 2, at 7-8 (These Canadian economists provide a nonlegal
review of the dispute mechanism).
10. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 9.
11. See i. art. 1904, para. 11 ("Neither Party shall provide in its domestic legislation for an
appeal from a panel decision to its domestic courts").
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tariffs on particular products.12  It was during the initial
negotiations that the Parties saw the opportunity for a more
encompassing approach to trade between the world's largest trading
partners. 3 At this point, the talks took on a new perspective as a
comprehensive trade regime. It is clear that the Parties also wanted
a successful free trade agreement to counter the single European
market planned for 1992 and to strengthen their negotiating
positions during the Uruguay Round of the GATT. 4 Actually, the
GATT dispute mechanism, with which both Canada and the U.S.
have been dissatisfied, is under review in the current round where
the U.S. and Canada are pushing for a stronger system through
improved rules.'"
From the beginning of the FTA talks, the United States sought
the opportunity to make inroads into traditionally protected areas
of the lucrative Canadian market. 6 Across the border, the newly
elected conservative Canadian government sought more favorable
access to traditionally protected U.S. sectors. 7 These objectives
and an unusually good relationship between the U.S. and Canadian
governments enabled the negotiations to expand. A joint
communique of the two leaders put a two-year deadline on the
negotiations. 8 Inevitably, the negotiations continued up until the
last minute when an agreement was finally reached at, and perhaps
later than, 9 the October 3, 1987, midnight deadline.2" The focus
12. On SL Patrick's Day in 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan met in
Quebec City, Quebec. This so-called "Shamrock Summit" produced ajoint communique expressing
the leaders' desire to pursue free trade negotiations. See 21 WEExLy CoMP. PRES. Doc. 325 (Mar.
25, 1985).
13. In 1986, bilateral trade between Canada and the U.S. was the largest of any two nations,
running at approximately 7% of the world's total trade. Rub Out the 49th Parallel, ECONOMIST, June
14, 1986, at 18.
14. Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YAIE J. INT'L L. 193, 242-43 (1987).
15. L Murphy, Brussels Ministerial Inclusive: GATT Talks Suspended to Allow Countries
to Reflect on Positions (Jan. 1991) (Louis J. Murphy is Acting Director, Office of Multilateral
Affairs) (available at the office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
16. The U.S. wanted access to the Canadian service and investment markets.
17. This is particularly true in the areas of finished goods (e.g. softwood lumber and seafood).
18. See supra note 12.
19. Many of the fine details of the FTA were worked out and agreed to after the official
deadline.
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here is on the dispute mechanism and the outcome of the
negotiations. Although not mentioned anywhere in the historical
literature, negotiators and direct comparisons reveal that the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), associated with the World Bank, served as the model for
the binational dispute mechanism in the FTA.21
The binationality of the panels appealed to the Canadians
because they perceived the countervailing duty determinations
made by the U.S. Department of Commerce as inconsistent on
Canadian softwood lumber products. Specifically, in 1983 the
Commerce Department made a final determination that the
Canadian government did not subsidize softwood lumber.22
However, faced with a new factual record in 1986, the Commerce
Department made a preliminary determination that certain stumpage
fees did constitute subsidies requiring application of countervailing
duties.' Canadians complained that the second determination was
politically motivated and unjust after the earlier determination. As
a result of this case, the Parties attempted to draft provisions to
cover subsidies. However, agreement could not be reached on
subsidies in time for inclusion in the FTA. U.S. Representative
Sam Gibbons, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Trade, of the
Committee on Ways and Means, offered the binational panel
mechanism for dispute settlement as a compromise after the Parties
failed to obtain substantive agreement on subsidies, AD, and CVD
rules.24 Hence, the compromise left AD and CVD determinations
20. This deadline was created by the U.S. fast-track negotiating procedure. Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L No. 93-618, § 151, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, § 1101, 93 Stat. 144, 307 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1988)).
21. Interview with Jonathan Fried, former Canadian FTA Subsidies Negotiator, currently with
the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 8, 1991). See Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention), opened
for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (Canada is not
a party to this convention); ECC-91-1904-01 USA (Mar. 29, 1991) (where the judge remarked on
counsel's use of the argument that the ICSID model should apply).
22. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983).
23. 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986).
24. See J. BELLo & A. HoLMER, GuIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE ARMET 815-
19 (1990) (providing an excellent account of the eleventh hour negotiations and a first hand account
of the American side of the negotiations).
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covered by the novel binational panel procedure. Consequently, the
Rules for Article 1904 were finalized between the end of the
negotiating period and the time that the FTA was to come into
effect on January 2, 1989.25 The general provisions were outlined
for the signing of the initial agreement in time for the U.S. fast-
track26 approval procedure. Later, amendments were made by the
respective national agencies.27
During congressional debate over the FTA implementing
legislation, there were questions raised regarding the
constitutionality of the binational procedure.28 The constitutional
issues included the fundamental role of U.S. courts under Article
Il, the appointment of foreign nationals under the Appointments
Clause, and due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment.29
The U.S. negotiators also expressed concern over the
constitutionality of the binational procedure, yet guaranteed the
finality of all panel decisions through an Executive Order affirming
any challenged decisions.3" Few Americans have criticized the
procedure, and there has never been a legal challenge to the
25. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212 (1988), amended by 54 Fed. Reg. 53,165 (1989). The dispute
settlement negotiations were conducted by the negotiators who had been working on the abandoned
subsidies provisions.
26. See supra note 20.
27. Errors in Federal Register Publication of Panel and ECC Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, pt.
IV (1988). See Amendments to the Article 1904 Panel Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,165 (1989).
28. J. BELLo & A. HOLMER, supra note 24, at 818. U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel questioned whether, under article III, the Canadian panelists should be
allowed to decide issues of U.S. law. There are many articles written on this issue, but no solution
has been reached. No patty has ever challenged the constitutionality of the procedure and the
presence of Canadians; although there are persistent and legitimate concerns.
29. See Note, The Binational Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States-Canadian
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 29 VA. J. INT'L
L. 681, 711 (1989) (A constitutional challenge would stand up). See also Christenson & Gambrel,
Constitutionality of the Binational Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L
LAW. 401 (1989); Note, The Constitutionality of Chapter Nmeteen of the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement: Article HII and the Minimum Scope of Judicial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 897
(1989).
30. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L No. 71-361, § 516(g)(7)(B), 46 Stat. 590,
amended by Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1516(g)(7)(B) (1988)). See Exec. Order No. 12,662, 54 Fed. Reg. 785 (1989) (providing for
acceptance of panel or committee final determinations. This order was issued to assure Canadians of
the validity of the panel decisions and is the so-called "'fallback" provision).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
procedure itself.31 Fortunately, comments from Canadians include
one by a Canadian panelist who reports that he feels comfortable
making decisions with the help of his American counterparts.32
While the negotiating history of the dispute mechanism and
current evaluation of its effectiveness are informative, the problems
arise mainly in trying to fulfill the original intent of the Agreement.
Though the Agreement is a compromise document, it does set out
to improve the adjudication of trade disputes with an eye toward
specific goals.
B. Speed
A primary goal of the binational process is to speed up the
appeals from agency trade determinations. As a consequence, the
binational procedure must be completed within 315 days from the
filing of a Request for Review.33  This is a substantial
improvement over the two to three year period under the previous
31. A legal challenge in the U.S. domestic courts is possible, but has not yet been taken up.
32. Chapter 19 Binational Panel Reviews Under the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: A Practitioners' Workshop, in Meeting of the Washington, D.C. Bar Association,
International Law Section (March 13, 1991) [hereinafter D.C. Workshop] (speech by Donald Brown,
Q.C., who has served on three Paving Parts panels).
33. FrA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 14. Panels have granted extensions for specific
circumstances pursuant to rule 20 when, in the interest of fairness, four of the five panelists agree
that such an extension is warranted. See, supra note 25, rule 20.
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domestic U.S. process 34 and the two to four year period under
Canadian procedures.35
The Agreement prescribes a more detailed timeline for
reviews.36 While the time schedule may be demanding on the
parties, panelists, and secretariats, it is extremely helpful to the
business parties involved in disputes. The fixed time schedule
allows for a final and binding resolution that can be relied upon in
business planning. It also allows the governments to review final
determinations for use in ongoing trade negotiations." In other
words, the FTA itself provides for negotiations and for the future
expansion of FrA coverage. Undoubtedly, negotiators will look to
decisions of the binational panels for guidance in future
agreements.
34. See Shambon, Accomplishing the Legislative Goals for the Court of International Trade:
More Speed! More Speed!, in SIXT ANNUAL JUDICrAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 8 (Nov. 1989). This report indicates that the median time for first remand
decisions at the Court of International Trade (CI) between January 1986 and September 1989 was
22 months. The CIT is the primary court of appeal in the U.S. for international trade disputes. See
Cannon, Jr., Dispute Settlement in the Article 1904 U.S.-Canada Binational Panel Versus the Court
ofInternational Trade, in SEVENTH ANNUAL JUDIc.AL CONFERENCE OF THE UNTD STATES COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Dec. 1990) (comparing the FTA dispute mechanism with the CIT
process). The previous procedures for appealing a U.S. determination permitted appeal to the CIT and
the U.S. federal courts. See Note, Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on Dispute Resolution
Under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 153, 161 (1989). The
binational panel mechanism has completely replaced this process for both U.S. and Canadian
determinations.
35. Ferguson, supra note 7. The traditional Canadian procedure allows for a two prong appeal
process depending on the issue. A party may appeal to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
(CiTI) and then the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) or the Department of National Revenue (DNR),
then the Tariff Board and the FCA once again and, though rare, to the Supreme Court of Canada.
36. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by D. Brown). The review timetable is as follows:
a) 30 days for the filing of the complaint;
b) 30 days for designation or certification of the administrative record and its filing
with the panel;
c) 60 days for the complainant to file its brief;
d) 60 days for the respondent to file its brief;
e) 15 days for the filing of reply briefs;
f) 15 to 30 days for the panel to convene and hear oral argument; and
g) 90 days for the panel to issue its written decision.
FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 14; 53 Fed. Reg. 53,232 (1988) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. §
356).
37. Under the FTA, the Parties have continued to negotiate areas where agreement was not
reached and those requiring further modification.
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C. Binding
Panel decisions are binding only on the parties to the particular
dispute and, therefore, are not to serve as precedent for other
panels or domestic courts and agencies.38 In particular, the
American parties face constitutional issues that arise regarding the
binding effect of binational panels.39 The main issue that arises is
whether U.S. courts deciding third country trade cases are bound
to apply panel developed law. If there is a successful constitutional
challenge to a binational panel or an extraordinary challenge by
committee decision, the American parties have included a fallback
provision which authorizes the President to affirm decisions
regardless of the domestic judicial outcome.' This provision was
designed to assure Canadians that the process would be binding and
politically respected.
D. Independent and Final
The Agreement grants panels and committees a great deal of
authority as final decisions are developed independently;41 they
are not controlled or influenced by any agency or Party.
Furthermore, in keeping with this mandate, paragraph ten of article
1904 states that the Agreement shall not affect either judicial
review procedures or cases appealed under those procedures in
third country determinations.42  Therefore, all third country
38. FTA, supra note 1, arts. 1904(9), (10), (11). See J. BE.LO & A. HoLAR,supra note 24,
at 789 (illustrating that this does not include third parties).
39. See H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1988) (statement of Administrative
Action).
40. Exec. Order No. 12,662, 54 Fed. Reg. 785 (1989).
41. FJAsupra note 1, art. 1909. This article establishes the national Secretariats as permanent
offices "to facilitate the operation of [Chapter Nineteen] and the work of panels or committees." Id
Each Party pays for its own Secretariat. The mandate of the Secretariats is to provide logistical
support for proceedings. Basically, they serve the same functions as judicial clerks (i.e., record
preparation, receive requests for review, organize briefs and similar filings, and disseminate these
documents to participants and the public) with the additional task of scheduling and facilitating
hearings. Understandably, this is no small undertaking because of the geographic locations of
participants and the amount of material submitted under the deadlines established.
42. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 10.
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determinations will be treated in the traditional method of domestic
review. Nonetheless, panels are permitted to rely on domestic trade
determinations regarding products from third countries. This fulfills
the negotiators' desire that the binational panels not create a new
parallel body of law for Canadian trade disputes.4"
To insure that the determinations are final, the Parties have
expressly removed the right of domestic judicial review or appeal
from panel or committee decisions." Conversely, the Agreement
does not affect the existing review procedures or cases appealed
under those procedures.45 It also does not apply to appeals where
a panel review is not requested nor to cases that were commenced
before the Agreement came into effect.46  These features
strengthen the authority and finality of Chapter Nineteen reviews.
E. Extraordinary Challenges
Despite the fact that the Agreement eliminates the right of
private parties to appeal panel decisions to domestic courts, it does
provide for review by an extraordinary challenge committee.
Article 1904, paragraph 13 establishes the extraordinary challenge
procedure.47 To date, there has been only one request for
48review.
A cursory examination of the panel decisions might
misleadingly indicate that parties to the procedure have been
completely satisfied with the panel process. However, upon closer
43. Interviews with Shirley Coffield and Jean Anderson, U.S. negotiators, in Washington D.C.
(Spring 1991).
44. FrA,supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 11 ("A final determination shall not be reviewed under
any judicial review procedures of the importing Party if either Party requests a panel with respect to
that determination within the time limits set forth in this Article. Neither Party shall provide in its
domestic legislation for an appeal from a panel decision to its domestic courts."). This provision
raises constitutional questions of judicially guaranteed review. See Anderson & Rugman, The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms 6 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1989, at 65, 74, 77 (providing a comprehensive analysis of U.S.
trade law and the exclusivity of FTA panel review, with insight on the Canadian perspective).
45. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 10.
46. Id, para. 12.
47. L par. 13; id Annex 1904.13.
48. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, USA-89-1904-11, ECC-91-1904-01 USA
(request for review from an rrc injury determination, 1991).
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examination of the literature and professional and academic
discussions, it is clear that not all panel decisions have been
favorably received. Actually, there was increasing pressure for an
extraordinary review. This may be an indication of the need to
improve the procedures, if disputants remain dissatisfied.
The extraordinary challenge procedure is only available upon
request to the federal governments for appeal, within a reasonable
time, from final binational panel decisions. This procedure, as its
name indicates, is intended for use in rare cases to safeguard
against panelist impropriety and cases where panels have departed
from their FTA mandate.49 Specifically, the FTA allows for a
challenge only where the action by a panel or panelist "materially
affect[s] the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the
binational panel review process." 5 These types of challenges are
meant to be rare and are not required unless one of the
governments asks for the-review. Private parties do not have the
right to invoke an extraordinary challenge committee; they must
instead petition the appropriate government which may, in its
discretion, request such a committee meeting.51
Once the need for a panel has been established, the Parties have
fifteen days to choose three members for the extraordinary
challenge committee.52 The members are selected from a roster of
49. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 13. The FrA language makes it clear that challenges
are only allowed when the actions of a panel seriously depart from the mandate of the FTA. Cannon,
supra note 34, at 43. See L Bm.LO & A. HOLMEt, supra note 24, at 792-93.
50. FrA, supra note I, art. 1904, para. 13(b). "'Where, within a reasonable time after the
panel decision is issued, a Party [one of the federal governments] alleges that:
a) i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction set forth in
this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected the panel's
decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process, that Party
may avail itself of the extraordinary challenge procedure set out in Annex 1904.13.
Id
51. L BE.LO & A. HoLmER, supra note 24, at 791-93.
52. FrA, supra note 1, Annex 1904.13.
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current and former judges from the United States and Canada.53
Each country selects one member from its roster and then jointly
choose the third. If they cannot agree on a third, the third member
is chosen either by the chosen two members or by lot. 4 Unlike
binational panels, there are no peremptory challenges of committee
members."
Pursuant to the FTA, the two governments have established a
separate set of procedural rules for the extraordinary challenge
committees.56 Committees have the authority to affirm, vacate, or
remand panel decisions.57 If the committee vacates the panel's
decision, a new panel must be chosen to rehear the dispute.58 The
Rules also specify that the committee has discretion to adopt its
own procedures. 9 The committee has even greater discretion to
"extend any time period fixed in [the] Rules" in the interests of
just, fair, and speedy resolution of challenges.' Nonetheless, to
insure a speedy process, the committee should make determinations
within thirty days of its formation.6' Similar to binational panels,
the committee is to apply the law of the country where the final
determination was reached.62 In so doing, the committee has the
53. Id. The roster totals ten jurists, five from each country. Sitting U.S. federal judges are
expressly prohibited from serving as arbitrators under the U.S. Statement of Administrative Action
because of ethical and other legal and practical considerations. The rosters are as follows:
For Canada For the United States
Jules Deschenes Arlin M. Adams
Willard Z. Estey Susan Getzendanner
Gregory Thomas Evans Charles B. Renfrew
Arthur Gordon Cooper Phillip W. Tone
Nathaniel Theodore Nemetz Harold R. Tyler, Jr.
J. Bum/o & A. HOLMER, supra note 24, at 850.
54. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1904.13, para. 1.
55. J. BELLO & A. HoLMER, supra note 24, at 814.
56. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25.
57. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1904:13, para. 3.
58. Id.
59. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25, rule 20.
60. Id. rule 17.
61. Id. rule 2.
62. Id. rule 25.
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authority to look at all relevant evidence in the record, 63 and
every decision must be in writing," by majority vote.65
With this background of the dispute mechanism, it is now
possible to examine the problems that currently face the procedure,
and propose potential solutions.
1Il. EMERGING PROBLEMS
The Rules were negotiated quickly during the closing days of
the FIA. Because of this, they were vague and had to be expanded
by the two governments after the Agreement was reached, but
before it took effect. Inevitably, there have been shortcomings in
the procedures. Some of the problems have been purely technical
which the Secretariats have been able to circumvent. Other
problems have been more fundamental and potentially affect the
outcome. This Part examines selected problems that have been
encountered during the first two years of the Agreement and
suggests practical solutions.
A. Technical Problems
The FTA rules for binational panels and extraordinary
challenges were not perfect in their inception, nor was perfection
expected. The framers knew that the process would have to be put
into effect and adjusted as required. There have been problems with
the way that the binational panels were intended to be
administered. Two of the major technical problems with the
procedural rules are the cumbersome panel selection process and
the proper role of the binational secretariats.
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63. Id. rule 26.
64. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25, rule 58(2). The written decision of the committee
must also include any concurring and dissenting opinions of the committee members.
65. Id. rule 55.
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1. The Panel Selection Process
The ad hoe panels are chosen by the Parties from a roster
(known as "service lists") of fifty individuals, the majority of
which must be lawyers" "of good character, high standing and
repute.., on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment,
and general familiarity with international trade law." 67 In the
interest of impartiality, the panelists cannot be affiliated with either
Party.68 Each Party is entitled to exercise four peremptory
challenges in confidence69 which must occur within forty-five
days of the request for the panel.7 Finally, the Parties together are
to choose the fifth panelist within sixty days.71 If they cannot
agree, the fifth panelist is selected by lot on the sixty-first day.72
Once the panel is selected, the panelists are to appoint a chairman
from among the lawyers on the panel.73 All panelists are subject
to the Code of Conduct.74 While the Rules appear to clearly
establish the process for panel selection, there are practical
problems that have arisen. Some of the problems encountered with
panelists have been conflicts of interest,75 peremptory challenges,
distance from the secretariats, and scheduling.
66. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2(2).
67. Id Annex 1901.2.
68. Id. Annex 1904.2(1).
69. Id. Annex 1901.2(2). Peremptory challenges are to be exercised simultaneously and in
confidence by the Parties.
70. Id. The article continues by allowing panel selection by lot of any vacant, unfilled, or
struck seal This article also allows for selection of panelists who do not appear on the official
rosters.
71. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2(3).
72. Id.
73. Id art 1901.2, para. 4. If the panelists cannot decide, by majority vote, on a chairman,
the chairman is selected by lot. See J. BELLO & A. HOLMER, supra note 24, at 807 (This promotes
the appointment of lawyers to the panel, so that the Parties increase their chances of obtaining the
chairmanship).
74. FTA, supra note 1, art. 19'10 (promulgated through an exchange of letters). See 54 Fed.
Reg. 53,212, supra note 25.
75. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILTY DR 9-101(A) (1980) ("A lawyer
shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judicial
capacity"). Actually, several of the panelists, as prominent trade lawyers, have had to turn down
appointments because of clients they represent or areas of law they may be arguing that impact
potential issues before the panels.
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a. Conflicts of Interest
The selection of practicing international trade lawyers for the
majority of the binational panel roster slots inevitably leads to
issues of conflicts of interest. One American legal panelist has had
to decline four times because of potential conflicts. 76 Actually,
many attorneys on the rosters appear before the panels as counsel
of record or before administrative bodies which are often parties to
binational disputes. Ivan Feltham, Professor of Business and Trade
Law at the University of Ottawa, has said that it is nearly
impossible to find panelists to serve and meet the conflict of
interest requirements.' In the Pork CVD case, suspension of the
entire proceeding was required when a panelist had to recuse
himself after being selected.78 Other panelists are hesitant to serve
because of the one year prohibition against representing any of the
parties involved, including the government.79  Nonetheless,
panelists are allowed to engage in other business during the term
of the panel, subject to the Code of Conduct provisions."0
The difficulty with using a small community of legal
professionals as panelists is obvious: the relationship between
private practitioner and binational panelist has the potential of
becoming blurred in appearance, if not in actuality. Despite the
objective professionalism that is td be expected from panelists, it
is impossible to completely separate personal experiences and
views on how trade law should evolve. Actually, it is possible that
a lawyer as a panelist in one case could argue for a similar position
in a private capacity by reference to the preceding opinion in which
76. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by David A. Gantz). It was also commented that,
in the end, this should not threaten the efficient functioning of the binational panel process.
77. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 813 (May 29, 1991) (stated at a conference on May 17, 1991,
sponsored by the Center for Trade Policy and Law in Ottawa, Canada).
78. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2, para. 9.
79. Id. art. 1910. Code of Conduct was agreed to in exchange of letters. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212,
supra note 25.
80. ld. Annex 1901.2, para. 10. See J. BELLo & A. HOLMEm, supra note 24, at 809. Panelists
are allowed to engage in business during their tenure in order to encourage people to serve. However,
under FTA Annex 1901.2(11), panelists are prohibited from appearing as counsel before other panels
at the time of their service for obvious appearance reasons. Panelists also enjoy immunity from suit
and legal process relating to performance in their official capacity. FA, supra, Annex 1901.2(12).
600
1991 / Canada-U.S. Free Trade Panel Procedures
he or she participated. Also, because the roster is limited to a small
number of trade lawyers, clients will likely seek those lawyers on
the service lists in order to gain a potential advantage. Nonetheless,
there are ways to overcome this problem.
The binational service lists could be expanded, as has been
done in the U.S.,81 to include a larger cross-section of the legal
community and more nonlegal professionals. A larger number of
panelists would increase the pool of experienced panelists and
reduce the chance of encountering conflicts. The extension of
membership to nonlegal persons would also reduce the chance of
selecting those who represent trade clients in private practice. Of
course, the chairman would still have to be legally trained. An
added benefit from the inclusion of outsiders in the process, though
requiring more preparation time, would be the fresh perspectives
they would offer the process and decision making.82
b. Peremptory Challenges
Despite the provisions in the FTA for peremptory challenges by
the Parties, there is no allowance for input from the disputants as
this part of the process occurs in confidence. In fact, under the
Rules, the only way to make a peremptory challenge is to wait
until the end of the process and go forward through the
extraordinary challenge procedure. This delay makes the process
extremely cumbersome, as the most logical opportunity for
peremptory challenges has past.
One suggestion has been to follow the arbitration rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).83 The UNCITRAL rules would require challenge
of a panelist within fifteen days of receiving information worthy of
challenge.84 This would reduce frivolous challenges, save time and
81. The U.S. has expanded its panel roster from 25 to 50 members.
82. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by P. Ebrenhaft)
83. Note, supra note 34, at 178 (comments by Stewart Baker, trade lawyer from Steptoe &
Johnson in Washington, D.C.) (citing UNC1TRAL Arbitration Rules, art 11, para. 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.77.V.6 (1977), reprinted in UNCITRAL 140, U.N. Sales No. E.86.V.8 (1986)).
84. Note, supra note 34, at 178.
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money, and further legitimize those panelists selected.85 Another
option could be to allow domestic national courts to hear such
challenges as an interlocutory matter.8 6 As has been pointed out,
there is no neutral party to resolve such preliminary disputes.87
The strongest argument is for a more open selection process where
the participants, in combination with their national governments,
are allowed input in the original selection process while keeping
the peremptory challenges confidential to all but the parties
involved. This would be a workable solution requiring little change
in the current procedure.
c. Administrative Problems
The U.S. Secretary for the Binational Secretariat, James
Holbein, reports that there are problems getting the voluminous
documents and administrative records to panelists in time for panel
hearings.88 Mr. Holbein also reports that the official allowance of
facsimile transmission of documents has been a saving grace in
meeting the rigid timetables set out in the FTA.89 Understandably,
the task of scheduling all parties for oral hearings in either nation's
capital is no small undertaking. There does not appear to be any
solution to these administrative tasks short of allowing extensions
of time deadlines by the Secretariats, which would sacrifice the
goal of a speedy procedure. However, violations by the submitting
parties could be dealt with more severely in the form of sanctions
and potential loss of filing privileges to encourage compliance.
Additionally, the financial rewards for service by panelists are
extremely low: $400 Canadian (U.S. $340) per day plus travel costs
and expenses.9" The panelists also lose time from their lucrative
85. IM
86. Id. (proposal by Professor George Bermann).
87. Id. at 177 (comments by Mr. Baker).
88. Interview with James Holbein, U.S. Secretary for the Binational Secretariat (Feb. 26,
1991).
89. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25, rule 25(I)(b).
90. FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2, para. 13. The panelists are also authorized to hire
assistants at the rate of $200 Canadian ($170 U.S.) per day pursuant to letters exchanged between
the Parties under article 1910. Id
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private practices. Yet, the expense has not deterred panelists from
deciding to serve. Undoubtedly, there are fringe benefits from
serving. These fringe benefits probably include increased stature as
an expert on the FTA and the personal satisfaction of public
service.
2. The Role of the Secretariats
The next issue that arises is what role the binational Secretariats
should play. Presently, the Secretariats are limited to a purely
administrative role, serving as clerks for the binational panel.91
Apparently, the negotiators contemplated a substantive role for the
Secretariats, but ultimately abandoned this idea.'
There are two areas in which these Secretariats could play a
greater role. First, the Secretariats could serve as motions judges,
deciding issues of the timeliness of filing deadlines. In fact,
domestic court clerks already perform this function. The concept of
a motions judge is discussed in greater detail in Part ELI.B. Second,
they could propose and amend the procedural rules, subject to
national supervision. The Secretariats are the obvious bodies to be
given this authority as they must work within the Rules and can
best evaluate the areas which need change. Actually, the
Secretariats already perform this function through internal, informal
discussions. The 1989 amendments to the Rules were a result of
this process. Such an expansion of the Secretariats' formal role
would also add continuity to the institutions. Of course, the Parties
would have to draw clear lines between technical and substantive
amendments, reserving the latter for international negotiation.
It has also been suggested that the two Secretariats work
together to further harmonize procedures between the two
institutions for panel review.9' This would add to the perception
of procedural fairness regardless of the location in which the
91. IL art. 1909.
92. Note, supra note 34, at 177 (comments by Professor Lowenfeld).
93. Interview with J. Alston, Assistant at the U.S. Binational Secretariat (June 12, 1991). Ms.
Alston stated that the Canadian rules of procedure are the same as the U.S. Rules.
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dispute is heard.94 It is important to remember that the staffs of
the Secretariats are intimately involved with the annual caseloads
and gain valuable experience that infrequent participants and
government agencies do not always share. Once again, there is the
concern that the ultimate decision making authority should remain
with the Parties.
There have already been amendments to the Rules because of
technical inconsistencies as well as required additions to the
language of the original Rules. This process should continue and
be formalized as the Secretariats encounter difficulties
administering the binational process. However, the major changes
that are required in some areas are not subject to agency
modification as they require international negotiation and legislative
approval.
B. Outcome-Affecting Problems
Some of the problems that have been identified in the Rules
potentially affect the final resolution of disputes. These include
what should be done with problems that arise before a tribunal is
empaneled to hear and render its opinion, and what effect that
decision should have once handed down.
1. Prehearing Problems
Prehearing issues that arise face the common problem that there
is no authority in place, other than fully constituted panels,
empowered to decide these issues. In the domestic setting, a judge
is available to rule on pretrial issues that potentially affect the final
outcome or whether a case is heard at all. FTA Chapter Nineteen
has no such equivalent. At present, there must be a panel formed
to hear the issue, and then make a ruling. This often occurs on the
same day as the hearing itself because of difficulties in scheduling
all the participants.
94. Note, supra note 34, at 179 (comments of Ms. Landers).
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a. Interim Notice of Motions Practice
The Rules provide for a motions practice." The motion rules
follow traditional common law practice, but place no substantive
limits on the type of motions that may be filed. There are also no
allowances for variations from the strict time limits of the overall
dispute timetable, not even for the panel itself.96 Fortunately, the
Rules do allow telephone conference calls for hearing motions.'
Personal appearance by the participants is not required.9
In practice, the notice of motion procedure has been used to
dismiss one dispute after it was found that the initial Request for
Review had been filed too late.99 After the panel makes its ruling,
it immediately dissolves itself.
There have also been problems with the motions practice on
substantive issues. Panels are required to hear and decide motions
on the same day that they hear the dispute. 1°° This presents the
parties to the dispute with the problem of not knowing how the
panel will rule and having to proceed based on a strategy that may
be wasteful of all participants' time and money. This is a
cumbersome and wasteful method of disposing of all but the most
important issues.
The obvious solution, once again, is to establish a motions
judge position. This independent jurist could resolve the issues
before they are presented to the panel. One suggestion is to give
the chairman of the panel this authority. Under such a scheme, the
dispute would stay within the binational process, and at the full
hearing the whole panel would be able to hear complaints from the
disputants about any questionable rulings. The important point
remains that the parties can continue the preparation of their cases
with knowledge of the ruling on their motions, at least until the
95. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25, rule 63.
96. Id. rule 63(4).
97. Id. rule 66(2).
98. Id. rule 66(1).
99. Oil Country Tubular Goods from Canada, USA-90-1904-02 (1991). This panel was
formed, heard the arguments regarding a late filing for a request for review or filing of briefs, and
then dismissed the case altogether.
100. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by G. Horlick).
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panel meets as a whole. Depending on the importance of the
motion, the parties may decide to alter their legal strategy. This
would also decrease the administrative burden on the Secretariats
by allowing the issue to be resolved before the panel meets.
b. Joinder of Claims and Parties
The next issue impacts the efficiency of the procedure. There
are two administrative determinations that must be made in any AD
or CVD case. First, the Commerce Department determination of
dumping or subsidization must be made. Second, the ITC must find
material injury or threat of material injury to domestic U.S.
industry.' The Canadian procedure involves a similar
process. 2 The parties adversely affected by these determinations
often seek redress at each stage.
Inefficiency exists where the parties must go through the
procedure two or more times in order to get review after each
determination in the administrative process. For example, three
U.S. cases have appeared before the binational panels multiple
times. 3 Under this scenario, it is possible that two panels could
exist simultaneously. This occurred in the Paving Parts case.'
The panels were composed of the same membership because the
Parties were responsible for their appointment and foresaw the
potential division of labor. This allowed for consolidation of the
panels and a more efficient process. Nonetheless, there have been
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (codifying the U.S. law on material injury determinations). See
GAIT, supra note 4, art. VI.
102. Canada follows the same GAT17 "material injury" standard as the U.S.
103. See Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, USA-89-1904-06 (review of Commerce
Department CVD determination 1991), USA-89-1904-11, ECC-91-1904-01 USA (review of lTC CVD
injury determination 1991); Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equpmentfrom
Canada, USA-89-1904-02 (review of Commerce Department AD scope determination 1990), USA-
89-1904-03 (review of Commerce Department AD determination 1990), USA-89-1904-05 (panel
consolidated with case -03 1990), USA-90-1904-01 (review of Commerce Department use of
information in AD determination 1991); New Steel Rails from Canada, USA-89-1904-07 (review of
Commerce Department CVD determination 1990), USA-89-1904-08 (review of Commerce
Department antidumping determination 1990), USA-89-1904.09/10 (review of ITC injury
determinations 1990).
104. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by L. Koteen) (response by B. Allberger, Chair
of Paving Parts) (panel consolidated USA-89-1904-05 with -03).
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two additional Paving Parts panels from separate Commerce
Department determinations. °5 The two New Steel Rails cases are
examples of different panel memberships for the subsidy and injury
reviews. '06
In anticipation of the duplication, the negotiators included rules
for joint panel reviews.1 7 However, this is conditioned on
acceptance by all the participants; subject to an objection being
filed within twenty days after the filing of the first Request for
Review.' It has been pointed out, in light of the Pork case, that
the real problem occurs when there is a remand to one agency
while another panel is meeting on a separate stage of the overall
determination." For instance, the Pork case involved
simultaneous reviews of the subsidy determination by the
Commerce Department and the material injury finding by the ITC.
This problem is not unique to the FTA process. The federal
court system is often burdened with duplicate claims and parties.
Unlike the binational process, federal judges have the authority to
join issues and interested parties. 10 The difference lies in the
amount of resources that are available to convene a panel and the
cost to litigants. This duplication could thwart the primary
objectives of the FrA. The panels are designed to speed up the
dispute process and save all parties time and money. Fortunately,
the Parties reserve the right to appoint panelists. By appointing the
same members to both panels, the Parties can avoid a turf battle
that could develop between two competing panels. Ultimately, the
long term solution must allow for joinder of parties and issues by
105. See USA-89-1904-02 (Commerce Department scope determination 1990), USA-90-1904-01
(Commerce Department 1988-89 annual administrative review 1991).
106. See USA-89-1904-07 (subsidy determination 1990); USA-89-1904-08 (AD determination
1990).
107. 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 25, rules 36-38.
108. Id. rule 36(3).
109. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by J. Tupin).
110. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 13,14,18,19,20,22,24 (Counterclaims and Cross-Claims,
rule 13; Third-Party Practice, rule 14; Joinder of Claims and Remedies, rule 18; Joinder of Persons
Needed for Just Adjudication, rule 19; Permissive Joinder of Parties, rule 20; Interpleader, rule 22;
Intervention, rule 24). See also C. WRGHT & A. MLER, 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2383, at 259 (1971) (Federal courts have broad discretion regarding consolidation).
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an overseeing authority, perhaps the motions judge suggested
above.
c. Alternate and Competing Fora
When the FrA came into force, petitioners were given the
choice of an alternative forum in which to file their trade cases.
Previously, they had been limited to the agencies themselves, the
Court of International Trade (CIT), and the federal court system.
The situation was similar on the Canadian side."' The binational
panel provides an international flavor because of its composition
and faster result. But there are disadvantages that parties may want
to consider before opting for the Chapter Nineteen procedure."'
The ultimate question facing the petitioner is whether it is
necessary to file simultaneously in the traditional forums in order
to protect any rights. The New Steel Rails case provided the first
test of this choice issue."' The petitioner filed a summons and
complaint in the CIT simultaneously to preserve action on the
constitutional issue of standing."' The CIT accepted the petition
but wisely stayed the proceeding until after the panel had made its
final determination. The CIT action was undoubtedly taken to
guarantee the petitioner a day in court, with the underlying hope
that resolution of the matter would let the CIT avoid the difficult
jurisdictional questions under the FTA.
Practitioners have recently stated that the panel should get the
first bite at constitutional issues, but that parties should have the
111. As of June 1991, Canada has not had any binational panel decisions-though there have
been two Requests for Review. Rick Dearden, an Ottawa lawyer, explains this situation as a result
of the CITr's reputation for fair hearings and the reluctance of the Federal Courts of Appeal to
overturn CITr decisions. Actually, none have been overturned in the last decade. 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 814 (May 5, 1991). Ellen Beall, the Canadian Binational Secretary, explains the disparity
through a Canadian's perception of the Agreement having greater importance and wanting to obtain
all its benefits. Id. at 651 (May 1, 1991).
112. See J. Cannon, Jr., Dispute Settlement in the Article 1904 U.S.-Canada Binational Panel
Versus the Court ofInternational Trade, 7th Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. C1T (Dec. 1990)
(providing an excellent evaluation of the pros and cons of choosing a forum for trade cases).
113. See USA 89-1904-07 (1990).
114. The petitioner questioned whether FTA panels were given the authority to decide questions
on this constitutional issue.
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option of domestic review. However, after domestic review panel
consideration of constitutional issues may not be necessary.'15
Others have commented that a technical reading of the FTA does
not allow for such a review. Rather, the Parties reserved their
national laws and procedures in the PTA, and a challenge to
constitutionality would violate the FTA itself.1 6 This technical
reading is most persuasive because in the event a FTA panel were
to strike down a statute as unconstitutional, there would not be an
opportunity for appeal.117 From an American jurisprudential
standpo,int this view is compelling. The question of the
constitutionality of statutes goes beyond the scope of review
envisioned by the framers of the FIA. The FTA was primarily
designed to be a temporary device to resolve specific disputes
regarding the application of U.S. trade law to the particular facts.
If the panel were to be given the authority to strike down statutes,
it would have a more encompassing impact on U.S. trade
jurisprudence, extending well beyond the parties to the dispute to
effect trade laws enacted to cover third country disputes. Such
authority would clearly exceed the original mandate of the FTA.
This problem demonstrates that the Parties must make it
possible for panels to decide the issue originally and allow appeal
to the domestic courts. Otherwise, litigants will be able to delay the
final determination of disputes by filing interlocutory motions in
other fora and thereby circumventing the goal of speed.
118
2. Panel Decisions
There has been increasing discussion of the panel decisions
themselves. To date there have been thirteen U.S. cases and two
Canadian cases." 9 As more decisions emerge, there will be an
opportunity to examine how the decisions are framed and received
as an independent body of law.
115. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by R. Trainer).
116. Id. (speech by L Cannon, Jr.).
117. Ma. (speech by J. Tupin).
118. Id. (speech by B. Allberger).
119. Binational Secretariat, Dep"t Commerce, Caseload Report (June 1991) (available monthly).
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a. Use of Legal Authority
It is clear from the FTA that the panels are only supposed to
rely on U.S. or Canadian trade law, depending upon which
government action they have been convened to review. However,
uncertainty exists when the area of law involved has not been
decided, when there is a split of authority, or where the law
includes the application of international law such as GATT
decisions.
i. Issues of First Impression
There will undoubtedly be novel issues presented which may
include areas of law not yet considered by the CIT or federal
courts. If the issue is truly one of first impression, a panel should
analyze it as would a domestic court of the country whose law is
in question. The panel should look at the jurisprudence in the area
and render its decision as to whether the agency made the
determinations in accordance with domestic law. An important
point raised by Judge Carman of the CIT is that panels should
defer to agencies when questions of first impression arise. 2 °
Also, panel decisions are only binding on the parties to a
dispute. '21 Therefore, any new law developed for a particular
panel dispute will not apply to third countries. In keeping with this
position, the primary concern of U.S. negotiators was to avoid the
development of two separate bodies of trade law: one towards
Canada and another toward third countries.
122
120. Note, supra note 34, at 167 (comments by J. Cannon, Jr.).
121. Id. at 168 (comments by L Toupin, Assistant General Counsel for the U.S. International
Trade Commission).
122. Id at 164 (comments of Jean Anderson, former Chief Counsel for International Trade at
the U.S. Department of Commerce and member of the U.S. negotiating team for the FTA subsidies
and trade dispute working group).
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ii. Split of Authority
Another problem that faces panels occurs when there is a split
of authority that has not been resolved by the domestic legal
regime. This issue was squarely raised in the Paving Parts case. In
that case, the panel found that the CIT had reached conflicting
results in the Zenith"a and Atcor 24 cases on the issue of
rebated taxes. The Paving Parts panel reasoned that stare decisis
did not apply, and made their decision following the precedent of
Zenith alone. Because of the different law being used by the panel,
when deciding the forum in which to file, the litigants must
consider that the panel's choice of precedent may be more
favorable and that there is no possibility of appealing the panel's
decision.1 " This is an unforeseen, yet unavoidable, consequence
of the binational procedure. Nevertheless, it should not be
detrimental if panels make rational choices and explain their
reasoning.
iii. Application of International Trade Law
Finally, it is important to remember that the FTA was
negotiated in light of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).12 In particular, the Chapter Nineteen procedure focuses
on domestic pricing and subsidies, areas both specifically covered
in the GATT Subsidies Code.127 In the U.S., there have been
fairly clear limitations placed on the use of the Code as a source
of law in reviewing agency decisions.'28 Gary Horlick, a
Washington trade lawyer and former deputy assistant Commerce
123. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 268, 633 F. Supp. 1382
(1986), aft'd, 875 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1989).
124. Atcor, Inc. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 148, 658 F. Supp. 295 (1987).
125. Cannon, Jr., supra note 34, at 31-33.
126. GAIT, supra note 4, art. XXIV.
127. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT,
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619. See Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979).
128. Note, supra note 34, at 166 (comments of Mr. Toupin). See J. BELLo & A. HOLMER,
supra note 24, at 851.
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Secretary, stated that panels should be allowed to apply GATT
codes and laws agreed to by the Parties."9 As regards the use of
another country's law, the FTA makes it clear that panels cannot
rely on foreign law unless a domestic court would do the same. 3 '
The idea of including general GATT law and codes in the body
of law available for binational disputes is appealing. Those
provisions signed by both countries should not raise disputes. It is
also appealing in the sense that if binational panels are able to rest
their decisions on this body of international law, it could reduce the
likelihood of resort to the cumbersome GATT dispute mechanism,
something both Parties should desire.
b. The Role of Dissenting Opinions
At the inception of the binational process, it was feared that
there would be bloc voting reflecting a national bias. It has also
been said that the national rosters contain individuals of great
stature which could cause problems as they would be strong-
minded, making it difficult to arrive at unanimous decisions. As a
result, there were proposals that unanimity should be required in all
decisions and that dissenting opinions should not be published.
31
However, the experience has been quite the opposite. All but two
of the decisions have been unanimous, and no block voting has
occurred.13 ' All tolled, there have been six unanimous decisions,
two dissents by nationals of other states, and two concurring
opinions.
13 3
None of the concerns raised above has created any controversy.
This is probably a reflection of panel unanimity and the unbiased
129. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 813, 814 (May 29, 1991).
130. FTA, supra note 1, arLt. 1902.
131. Note, supra note 34, at 177 (comments of Judge Carman). See FTA, supra note 1, Annex
1901.2, para. 5 (Dissenting and concurring opinions must be published).
132. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 814 (May 29, 1991) (comments by R. Dearden). ITC Acting
Chairperson Ann Brunsdale said that "the opinions of the panels to date have been fair, balanced,
and unbiased ... the panels have voted on the facts rather than in national blocs." Id.
133. A. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal 9 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished manuscript presented
at the Administrative Conference of the United States).
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professionalism that has been exhibited by the panelists. Even the
Pork case, probably the most controversial to date, was a four-to-
one majority decision.
c. Consistency Among Panel Decisions
As both Canada and the United States have common law
systems of jurisprudence, the question of consistency among panel
decisions must be addressed. The panelists are primarily lawyers
trained in the use of precedent. Also, the membership of panels is
constantly changing. Therefore, the law that panelists use to decide
cases is likely to be that decided in previous panel decisions.
David Gantz, Chairman of the New Steel Rails CVD panel, said
that he sees no problems with panels relying on previous binational
decisions. He views such reliance as a necessity in order to provide
consistency and prevent duplication of effort."M For example, the
Pork CVD case cited the New Steel Rails decision on the issue of
the burden on the ITC when finding threat of material injury.135
This use of prior decisions is likely to continue as more decisions
are rendered. There has been a problem obtaining prior panel
decisions. Recently, that has been overcome as both LEXIS and
Westlaw computer services have added the decisions to their
databases.
The question remains regarding the resolution of conflicting
precedent set by previous decisions, as in the Paving Parts
resolution of conflicting CIT opinions. There is no FTA negotiating
history on this point. Currently, the panel decides how much use to
make of previous panel decisions. The answer is not simple and
obviously remains unsettled for future panelists to decide.
However, the experience of the panelists and the reluctance of
making new law weighs heavily against a new review of recurring
issues.
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134. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by D. Gantz).
135. USA-89-1904-11 at 10. See Cannon, Jr., supra note 34, at32 (comments of the panelists').
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d. Interim Relief
The forms of relief available to FTA petitioners in AD and
CVD cases evokes comparison with the old procedures. The CIT
and domestic U.S. courts have greater interim powers than
binational panels (e.g., injunctive relief and an interlocutory
procedure allowing for stays). This can be very important in the
business context: deciding in which forum to file without fearing
tactical requests for binational review by another party in search of
a more favorable forum. In the U.S. system, preliminary injunctions
can mean the life or death of a business venture. This is because,
once the Commerce Department and the ITC have made an
affirmative injury determination, the Customs Service is instructed
to liquidate all merchandise that enters the country related to the
resolution. Under CIT injunctive powers, a party affected by such
a determination can enjoin the liquidation until there is a final
judicial decision.136 The parties risk their case becoming moot if
they do not act to preserve their injury claim.137 Unfortunately,
an injunction requires the CIT to rule on the merits of a case, a
judgment which the FTA leaves exclusively to binational panels.
Therefore, the disputants appear to be without interim relief under
the FTA regime as panels have no comparable injunctive or
protective powers.
The difference in available relief will likely lead to forum-
shopping, something frowned upon by the U.S. domestic legal
system. The obvious solution to this deficiency is to create a
procedure for petitioners to obtain interim relief from agency
determinations. This procedure would either give the panel's
chairman or proposed motions judge the same authority to enjoin
the liquidation of alleged violating goods or allow for resort to the
domestic courts while the panel process is ongoing.
136. Kennedy, Binational Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,
13 MD. 3. INT'L L. & TRADE 71, 90 (1988).
137. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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3. The Extraordinary Challenge in the Pork Case
The extraordinary challenge process has been invoked only
once to date. 3' The Parties made it clear in the FTA that such a
challenge was to be requested only in rare cases. On March 29,
1991, the Bush Administration requested the formation of an
extraordinary challenge committee to review the Pork binational
panel final decision.139 The invocation of the process in the Pork
case is a significant development in the history of the Agreement.
For that reason, the challenge must be looked at closely to
determine if there are significant problems with the dispute
mechanism.
In the Pork case, two ITC Commissioners wrote a scathing
attack on the panel's remand of the case. The dispute involved a
1989 ITC injury determination14 ° after a Commerce Department
CVD investigation of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from
Canada. The Canadian-chaired panel14 ' determined that the ITC
received evidence beyond those issues in the record. On the second
remand the ITC reluctantly held that U.S. pork producers were not
injured nor threatened with material injury despite a Commerce
Department determination that Canadian pork was subsidized. 42
In the remand opinion, Commissioners Rohr and Newquist devoted
twenty-eight pages of a thirty-two-page opinion to a description of
what they felt were violations of the FTA by the binational panel.
Characterizing the panel's decision as "counterintuitive,
counterfactual, and illogical but legally binding," the
Commissioners expressed their views on the panel's remand of
138. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Port from Canada, ECC-91-1904-O1USA (request for an
extraordinary challenge committee).
139. Former U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Arlin Adams chaired the Committee; he sat with
Willard Estey, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Gregory Evans, former Chief
Justice of Ontario. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 569 (Apr. 17, 1991).
140. USITC Pub. 2218, Inv. No. 701-TA-298 (final Sept. 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 37,838 (1989).
141. Simon V. Potter of Canada chaired the panel; E. David Tavender and John Whalley of
Canada, and Kathleen F. Patterson and Tom M. Schaumberg of the U.S., participated. Both Potter
and Tavender have served on other binational panels.
142. USITC Pub. 2218, supra note 140, at 4-5.
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their decision. 43 The majority went out of its way to make clear
that it completely disagreed with the panel's determination in the
case, but was required to follow the decision under U.S.
implementing law.1" The Commissioners first accused the panel
of violating the FrA itself in arriving at a preordained result
favorable to the Canadian party. They said that the panel, in
finding an independent form of due process within the FTA, went
beyond domestic U.S. law in criticizing the ITC's evidence
gathering methods.145 The Commissioners continued by noting
that the panel unnecessarily restricted the ITC's ability to remand
a case to an agency by using the excuse that the matter must be
completed within the 315 day period required by the FrA.
146
Additionally, the opinion pointed out that the panelists
inconsistently criticized the ITC for relying on a Canadian
publication that was made available after its original opinion, while
the panel itself used a U.S. publication that came out at an even
later date. 47 The opinion made clear that, while the ITC was
forced to comply with the panel's ruling, the ruling should not be
held to alter U.S. administrative law or practice. Finally, they
concluded that the method of administrative review was not
affected by this decision.
4 8
In a concurring opinion, Acting Chairman Brunsdale, expressed
her support for the panel's criticisms. She stated, without the
benefit of being able to read the majority's opinion,149 that the
panel's views on due process and product shifting were well taken.
However, she had reservations regarding the panel's interpretation
of the U.S. AD statute, 5 " but she understood the confusion in
143. Id. at 19-34.
144. Id. at 34.
145. Id. at 6-7.
146. Id. at 8-10.
147. USIrC Pub. 2218, supra note 140, at 10-12.
148. Id. at 12-18.
149. It is 1TC practice that the majority opinion is not released to any Commission members
outside the majority until public release.
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii).
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that the ITC uses the statute in a confusing manner."' In a
separate forum, Brunsdale has noted that the Chapter Nineteen
procedure has worked well, but that panels may be showing too
much deference to ITC decisions. 152 She explained that the ITC
must be required to "make the substance of [its] decisions more
clear."
1 53
Predictably, the Canadian response was that the panel process
had worked to produce a fair, expeditious, and binding result.154
John Crosbie, the Canadian international trade minister,
characterized the U.S. invocation of the extraordinary challenge
procedure as "harmful to the Free Trade Agreement if every trade
dispute ends up in [a challenge]. ' 155 Prime Minister Mulroney
has stated that the Canadian government considers the challenge an
abuse of the dispute resolution process and that the outcome will
influence Canada's participation in future trade agreements,
presumably referring to the on-going NAFTA talks.156 Canadian
lawyer, Rick Dearden warns that the challenge already sets a
dangerous precedent and that the "whole system [will] fall apart
unless this is an aberration., 157 Perhaps in an act of appeasement,
the Commerce Department complied with the binational panel's
ruling at least until the extraordinary challenge committee had
issued its determination.
15
The American administration appears to have requested a
review for collateral reasons. A letter signed by Members of
Congress pleaded the case for a review, threatening withholding of
fast-track authority needed for the GATT and NAFTA
negotiations.159 Senator Tom Daschle called for congressional
151. D.C. Workshop, supra note 32 (speech by J. Cannon) (providing an insightful analysis,
critical of the panel's application of U.S. administrative law).
152. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 813, 814 (May 29, 1991).
153. Id.
154. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 264 (Feb. 20, 1991) (comments of John Crosbie, the Canadian
Minister of International Trade).
155. 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 569 (Apr. 17, 1991) (comments before the Canada Society).
156. Id.
157. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 813, 815 (May 29, 1991).
158. Id.
159. Interview with Jonathan Fried, supra note 21.
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review of the FTA, in light of the ITC decision, before the U.S.
entered negotiations on the NAFTA.' 6
The outcome of the challenge was in favor of the Canadian
pork producers.16' The Committee summarily dismissed the
contentions of the U.S. petitioner and the U.S. government. If the
case had gone against them, the Canadians could have carried it
further to the GATT dispute mechanism. 6 2 This could have been
viewed as a setback to the usefulness of the Free Trade Agreement.
However, a reassessment of its usefulness may still be in order in
light of the problems identified above. On a cautionary note, the
new Canadian Minister for International Trade, Michael Wilson,
has said that Canada will not reopen the FrA, but will participate
in the on-going NAFrA discussions. 63
IV. METHODS OF CHANGE
There are many ways to make the changes that have been
suggested above. The method chosen depends on the impact it will
have on the original Agreement. That is, the more fundamental the
change, the more likely it is that it will require an amendment to
the implementing legislation in both countries, something that is
difficult to accomplish. Also on the horizon are the on-going
NAFTA negotiations which include Canada, the U.S., and Mexico.
On a global platform, the current Uruguay Round of the GATT is
in the process of revising its trade dispute mechanism. '" Any of
these fora could provide the opportunity to replace and, thereby,
amend the U.S.-Canada FrA.
The changes that require legislative action are those primarily
in the "outcome affecting" category. The Executive Branch of the
United States is hesitant to reopen the Agreement fearing, with
good reason, congressional tinkering. However, there are certain
areas that could be improved given the opportunity.
160. 8 Intl Trade Rptr. (BNA) 342 (March 6, 1991).
161. See supra note 138 (request for extraordinary challenge committee).
162. 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 3, 1991).
163. 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 804 (May 29, 1991).
164. Murphy, supra note 15.
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The most significant adjustment, to make the system more
efficient for all parties, is the addition of a motions judge. This
person could adjudicate prehearing motions and give a more direct
statement on the type of claims that can and should be joined for
consolidated proceedings.
The extraordinary challenge procedure is the only source of
appeal from binational panel decisions. Yet, there remain issues
that are reasonably thought improper for panel review (e.g.
constitutional issues not addressed by the U.S. judicial system). It
must be decided whether the panels should have the authority
outright or whether such issues should be deferred to a domestic
court first. It is this writer's opinion that panels must be given the
authority to make all decisions as the court of first resort.
A. Upcoming Opportunity: NAFTA
On February 5, 1991, President Bush announced after
consultations with President Salinas of Mexico and Prime Minister
Mulroney of Canada, that there was agreement between the leaders
to enter negotiations for a trilateral free trade agreement."5 This
negotiation currently aims to develop a similar trade dispute
mechanism. Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Representative, stated that
the NAFTA negotiations will recommend the establishment of a
dispute settlement mechanism similar to the one under discussion
above." Inevitably, the parties will use the binational panel
165. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Press Conference by the
President (Feb. 5,199 1),partly reprinted in Auerbach, Talks Begin On 3-Nation Trade Pact; Canada
Will Join U.S. and Mexico, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1991, § Financial, at BI (fimal ed.), and in Auerbach,
Factions Din in Positions Against Mexico Trade Pact; Opposition Fears Loss of Jobs, Factories,
Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1991, § Financial, at Fl (final ed.). The President also noted that the goal of the
negotiations was to "link [the] three economies in bold and far reaching ways." Additionally, he
said, "A free trade area encompassing all three countries would create a North American market of
360 million people, with annual production of more than $6 trillion.- Significantly, he continued by
saying, "A successful trade agreement ... would be a dramatic first step toward the realization of
a hemispheric free trade zone, stretching from Point Barrow Alaska to the Straits of Magellan....
In cooperation with Mexico and Canada, we will work actively to conclude these negotiations
expeditiously." Id
166. Statement of Ambassador Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative, before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Mar. 20, 1991).
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procedure as a model. One difficulty that has been identified is that
the Mexican civil law system complicates the idea of simply
overlaying the current procedure,167 while Canada and the U.S.
share a common judicial procedure and similar statutory trade law
regime.
What will come of these negotiations, or even what the specific
objectives are, remains secret for protection of negotiating
positions. Therefore, it is difficult to say definitively what the
agreement will look like and how it will ultimately mesh with the
U.S.-Canada FTA. However, the fast-track procedure, under which
the U.S.-Canada FTA is being negotiated,16 provides the
opportunity for a completely new North American agreement that
encompasses the changes contemplated above in the trilateral
setting.
B. The Uruguay Round: GATT
The recent incorporation of free trade into the international
trading system was expanded and codified after World War II with
the inception of the GATT." The GATT system seeks the
elimination of trade barriers through negotiation similar to the FTA
process.1 70 The GATT dispute mechanism has recently been
renegotiated in draft form to produce a more streamlined
procedure.17 ' There are those who suggest that the FTA was
negotiated to provide a model for GATT dispute resolution
reform. 72 In reality, the FTA is a regional improvement,
167. Auerbach, U.S., Mexico GetDown to Business on Trade Talks, Wash. Post, May 28, 1991,
§ Financial, at E4 (final ed.). Senator Moynihan noted differences with the Mexican judiciary in the
area of dispute settlement under the NAFTA negotiations. Id.
168. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 803 (May 29, 1991). The House of Representatives, on May 23,
1991, and the Senate, on May 24, 1991, approved the fast-track presidential negotiating authority.
The House of Representatives (by a vote of 231 to 192) and the Senate (by a vote of 59 to 36),
rejected resolutions that would have denied fast-track authority. Id
169. GAIT, supra note 4.
170. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L J. 51 (1987).
171. GAIT, supra note 4.
172. Parker, Dispute Settlement in the GATI and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23
J. WOVRL TaRDE, No. 3, at 83 (1989) (noting the differences between the GAIT and the FI'A).
Some differences are: the GAIT has membership of over 103 countries, the FTA has a more
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designed to go further by protecting against bias and eliminating
excessive delays in processing complaints. The GATT's main
difference with the FTA is that private parties are the initiators and
participants in the process."'
The fact remains that if the FTA dispute mechanism is
perceived as a success, it can be cited as a model for a future
dispute resolution regime worldwide. If, on the other hand, the
binational panels do not gain similar acceptance in the global
forum, there is nothing lost, as the North American trade
relationship will not have sacrificed anything.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the end, the binational panel process, which started out as an
unforeseen outgrowth of the unresolved subsidies negotiations, has
worked remarkably well. Its success, in large measure, is a tribute
to the panelists and Secretariats. The panel's continued success will
require the interim modifications suggested above. However, the
on-going NAFTA negotiations may provide the opportunity for
incorporating the adjustments into whatever dispute mechanism
emerges.
On a larger scale, the acceptance of such a procedure may
greatly influence changes in the GATT dispute mechanism. This
could ultimately improve the world trade system and give new life
to what many feel is a system in decay. Ultimately, the fair and
peaceful resolution of trade disputes can only improve political and
economic relations throughout the world as long as others view the
Chapter Nineteen process with envy.
substantive regime, and Canadian-U.S. trade law is relatively similar to each other. Nonetheless, the
FTA is an experiment that fits neatly within the GATT framework, and the Treaty itself often refers
to the GATT by name. Id.
173. Cluchey, Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement 40 ME. L REv. 338 (1988).
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